MULTI-AGENT UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLE VALIDATION VIA ROLLING-HORIZON ROBUST GAMES by Quigley, Kevin J
ABSTRACT
Title of thesis: MULTI-AGENT UUV VALIDATION VIA
ROLLING-HORIZON ROBUST GAMES
Kevin J. Quigley, Master of Science, 2019
Thesis directed by: Professor Steven Gabriel
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Autonomy in unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) navigation is critical for
most applications due to inability of human operators to control, monitor or inter-
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sis proposes a game theory-based benchmark validation technique for trajectory opti-
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complete information and stochastic environmental conditions. A MATLAB-GAMS
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The expansion of new technologies in autonomous systems, particularly in
unmanned vehicles, provides opportunities for innovative improvements across in-
dustries, principally to improve upon time and energy efficiency, safety, and cost-
effectiveness of dangerous or monotonous tasks. With applications in oceanography,
deep sea exploration, offshore commercial infrastructure monitoring and maritime
defense, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) have a wide range of mission sets,
characteristics and requirements [1]. Each mission set inherently requires advances
in autonomy, energy and propulsion, sensors and sensor processing, communica-
tions/navigation, and engagement/intervention [10]. While these components all
significantly impact the performance of UUVs, the research area of autonomy and
control is critically important due to its operating environment and presents the
greatest challenge. In such a complex and often restricted environment, UUVs re-
quire significantly more robust autonomy than do other unmanned systems due to
limited–and often lack of--communication with human controllers [10].
As the roles and capabilities of unmanned systems expand to improve au-
tonomous performance, the test, evaluation, verification and validation (TEVV)
becomes a critical factor in building confidence in autonomy. For adaptive and non-
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deterministic systems, a new approach to TEVV is needed, especially considering
emergent behavior from interacting autonomous systems [9].
The rapid propagation of unmanned systems into various applications across
industries will presumably continue, and there is little doubt that unmanned under-
water vehicles will be at the forefront of maritime exploration, ocean engineering
and naval defense. Due to the inherent difficulty in maintaining a communication
link between human controllers and underwater vehicles, the autonomy required for
UUVs needs to be significantly more sophisticated than in other unmanned sys-
tems [10]. The need for reliable autonomy implies a demand for the verification and
validation (V&V) of UUVs across various mission sets and vehicle configurations.
1.2 Problem Description
This thesis outlines a game theory-based approach to validation for current
and future path-planning methods for unmanned underwater vehicles. There exist
many methods developed and improved upon over the past two decades in the realm
of path planning for autonomous systems, primarily in determining optimal paths
and ensuring collision avoidance for wheeled and aerial vehicles. Generally, the
behavior of these systems can be described as a function of time-varying decision
variables, state variables, and uncertain parameters.
For the purposes of this study, the term “agent” refers to a single UUV or
a team thereof, with unique objective(s) and constraints. Figure 1.1 describes the
spatio-temporal system considered in this thesis. The state variables x(t) refers
2
Figure 1.1: Spatiotemporal System with General Variables [23]
to the current vehicle position and velocity at each time step, while the decision
variables u(t) refers to thrust (in the form of acceleration) along an intended path.
Uncertain parameters p(t) refer to the external (exogenous) uncertain conditions in
the environment such as size and position of obstacles, water currents, etc. Uncer-
tainty can also arise from internal (endogenous) conditions due to learning. The
objectives of each agent (represented by performance y(t)) differ based on their role.
1.3 Focus of this Research
The goal of this research is to develop a scenario-driven benchmarking tech-
nique to validate current and future UUV trajectory-planning models as they inter-
act with other agents via rolling-horizon robust non-cooperative games. A particu-
lar two-player, pursuit-evasion game is presented for two rigid-body robotic systems
controlled by adversarial agents denoted as the “attacker” and “defender,” respec-
tively. Figure 1.2 provides a simple visual example of the pursuit-evasion game.
The red diamond represents the attacker UUV, which selects a path (red dashed
line) based on a multiple objectives to reach a target point (green triangle) while
3
Figure 1.2: Two-player Pursuit-Evasion Game
maximizing the distance from the defender UUV. The defender, represented by the
blue square, has an objective to intercept the attacker, and selects a path (blue
dashed line) that minimizes the distance between the two. These objectives, along
with common constraints will be described in depth in the following chapters.
This thesis combines the concepts of mixed complementarity problems (MCP),
rolling-horizon foresight with incomplete information, stochasticity, and an infinite
state space. While the majority of this thesis considers the specific application of
military UUVs, the formulations presented can be generally applied across vehicle
platforms and dimensions. For instance, the model presented could also be modified
to reproduce wildlife tracking and monitoring scenarios, open water search and
4
rescue, drug-traffic interdiction, or even life guarding.
1.4 Literature Review
This section identifies some of the methods and considerations in the current
literature, which help to set the conditions for the research upon which this thesis
is based.
1.4.1 Path-Planning Methods for Unmanned Systems
While validation of unmanned systems can refer to the control systems, struc-
tural design, material selection, or human-machine interface, the focus of this thesis
is path and trajectory planning. Chapter 2 presents a constrained nonlinear program
that models the trajectory for a single UUV, with non-convex obstacle avoidance,
whose quadratic objective it is to minimize the distance to a stationary target.
This thesis discretizes time into constant time steps and models motion using
direct collocation as defined in [20]. Continuous time, position, velocity and accel-
eration are mapped onto discrete vectors associated with times t0, t1, ..., tK called
collocation points. In trajectory planning, there is typically some continuous inte-
gral to be minimized in the objective function, which can be approximated via a
summation, made possible by these collocation points.
Even with discrete time steps, obstacles along a potential trajectory in an
infinite state-space present challenges in the form of non-convex feasibility con-
straints. Current trajectory optimization methods in continuous space generally use
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a sequential convexification technique to address non-convex obstacle constraints.
These include [45], which describes an algorithm called Ascp for unmanned aerial
vehicles that leverages the existing A∗ (a best-first search heuristic based on Dijk-
stra’s algorithm) to compute an initial guess for its sequential convex programming
model. The authors find that Ascp globally converges to local optimum (specifically,
a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker point) at each time step, which is of particular interest for
finding an equilibrium point in path planning for multiple agents with opposing ob-
jectives. However, Ascp requires a mixed-integer program to be initialized, which is
not conducive to finding equilibrium solutions. A similar approach, SCvx [28], [25]
and [12] uses lossless successive convexification and trust regions to converge to op-
timal trajectories. To improve computation time of finding sequential solutions, [8]
presents the decoupled multi-agent iSCP technique. Other methods, namely the
optimization-based collision avoidance (OBCA) scheme [44], leverage second-order
cone programming and strong duality to enforce the non-convex obstacle avoidance
constraints.
While the non-convexity of obstacle avoidance constraints presents limitations,
the focus of this thesis is not to achieve guaranteed optimality, but to validate multi-
agent feasibility of UUV trajectory-planning methods when interaction among non-
cooperative agents influences decisions. Thus, the benchmark model retains non-
convexity, but demonstrates a good success rate using even elementary initialization.
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1.4.2 Game Theory in Path-Planning
There exist both cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic representa-
tions of unmanned system motion planning. For instance, the time-optimal multi-
stage open-loop game formulation presented in [39] offers a variant of the fast march-
ing method for shortest path problems to find safe-reachable paths in a pursuit-
evasion differential game. On the other hand, [18] leverages Voronoi partitioning to
generate a guaranteed capture decentralized control scheme for a multiple pursuer-
single evader game in the plane. Specific to UUVs, [13] presents a neural network-
based approach to finding an equilibrium solution via the Minimax algorithm to
an asymmetric skirmish between an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) and
a manned submarine. Meanwhile, [41] presents an open-loop Defender-Attacker-
Target Game and [24] describes a distributed cooperative game-theoretic control
algorithm for area coverage.
A brief overview of game theoretic concepts is presented in Chapter 2, while
Chapter 3 presents a solution to the non-linear program via Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
optimality conditions and presents a small multi-player example. In the pursuit-
evasion game (PEG) scenario described in Chapter 3, the “attacker” agent’s ob-
jective is to most efficiently reach its target destination while avoiding interception
by other vehicle(s). Meanwhile, the “defender” agent’s mission is to minimize the
distance to the nearest attacker vehicle.
This scenario of autonomous unmanned vessels swimming around indepen-
dently, identifying and engaging enemy assets is of particular interest to naval lead-
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ers in studying anti-submarine warfare [1]. This problem can also be translated to
the “time critical strike” (TCS) naval mission set, though UUVs seem best suited
for delivering weapons caches rather than autonomous weapon launches due to in-
ternational man-in-the-loop launch control requirements [14].
1.4.3 Uncertainty and Foresight in Underwater Navigation
The nature of underwater systems sets them apart from other unmanned sys-
tems due primarily to the difficulties involved with human-machine interaction, as
well as other environmental complexities. Unlike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
or unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), line-of-sight quickly becomes an operating
constraint on manual control and/or monitoring [34]. Due to inconsistent GPS re-
liability underwater, UUV navigation is particularly challenging, and depends on
dead reckoning (i.e., setting a heading from a known point to a destination and
traveling along a constant straight trajectory), inertial and gyroscopic sensors [34].
Additionally, sonar performance is a complex function of transmission loss, rever-
beration and noise levels [13]. These parameters can vary based on water salinity,
temperature, surface conditions, depth of the vehicle, and sea-bottom shape [13].
For these reasons, detection of obstacles and other vehicles can become difficult at
any range and highly unreliable at long ranges. Thus, in Chapter 4, rolling-horizon
foresight is presented in order to simulate periodic sonar updating and limited field
of view that exists underwater. Rolling-horizon foresight is not, in itself, a new
concept. Several current models [37], [17] consider similar receding horizons for
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mixed-integer program path planners for multiple vehicles, while [38] uses reced-
ing horizons for online tube model predictive control (TMPC). Rolling horizons are
also often used in approximate dynamic programming (ADP) [33], which optimizes
near-term decisions for large state spaces while approximating the value of future
decisions.
Uncertainty can arise in many forms. Uncertainty in the vehicle dynamics can
be represented implicitly through symbolic bounds on velocity and acceleration [31],
while environmental uncertainty is often represented in the form of obstacles with
stochastic location, size or velocity. Much of the literature accounts for obstacle
avoidance by modeling a safe path via a “tube” around a nominal trajectory [27],
[38], or by inflating the obstacles to provide a buffer region [44], [32]. The model
presented attempts to find collision free trajectories with static obstacles, using the
latter approach to admit some uncertainty in the obstacles it perceives within a
specified interval. Thus, robust obstacles are also presented in Chapter 4, which
simulate the inherent error that propagates in water over long ranges, even utilizing
forward-looking sonar and video for obstacle avoidance.
1.4.4 Research Contributions
The concepts critical to this research are partly and independently examined
in the current literature, as described in Table 1.1. Path-planning and trajectory-
optimization have been investigated extensively in the literature, though as of yet,
none have been discovered that combine stochastic environmental conditions (ro-
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Table 1.1: Research Contributions
Research Areas * Existing Literature
[30] [20] [31] [27] [38] [37] [45] [17] [40] [41]
Unmanned System V & V X X X
UUV Path Planning X X X
Continuous-Space Trajectory X X X X X
KKT Optimality X X X
Multi-Agent Model X X X X X
Non-cooperative Games X X X
Nash Equilibrium X X
Rolling-Horizon Foresight X X X X
Stochastic Obstacle Avoidance X X X
bust obstacles), rolling-horizon foresight (incomplete information) and adversarial
influences (non-cooperative games).
This thesis combines all these components in order to establish a game theory-
based trajectory benchmark tool. This tool can be implemented to check the func-
tional feasibility of practical path-planning tools using common parameters.
The model presented seeks to establish a multi-player, rolling-horizon, robust
equilibrium. For the purposes of validation, a solution to such a model can serve as
a “perfect-information reality” benchmark. Benchmarking in this sense provides a
lower bound best-case feasible trajectory strategy for each UUV, assuming all other
agents have perfect information of its action within each planning horizon. This
can be used to validate the feasibility of solutions from non-learning, independent
trajectory optimization models, specifically in non-cooperative scenarios.
Specifically, a simple two-player pursuit-evasion game (PEG) is built using
a General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)-MATLAB interface [6], [29], [11].
This simulation is run using a constrained nonlinear program formulation in various
two-dimensional environmental configurations to determine their respective accu-
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racy with respect to a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT), or equilibrium, point at each
time step. The results of this simulation and conclusions drawn are presented.
Future work could generalize the approach to more complex multi-agent systems
and incorporate vehicle-based, rather than geocentric dynamics. In addition, the
non-convex obstacle constraint qualifications could be investigated analytically, or




Non-Convex Optimal Trajectory Problem
2.1 Problem Description
To solve a continuous-time, optimal control problem via optimization meth-
ods, we should first discretize the trajectory [28], giving us a finite set of decision
variables. To do so, we use direct collocation as in [20], mapping continuous position
p(t), velocity v(t) and acceleration u(t) (control) to their values at specific instances,
known as collocation points:
t→ t0, ..., tk, ..., tN , x(t)→ x0, ..., xk, ..., xN , u(t)→ u0, ..., uk, ..., uN .
Note that the notation → means “maps to” in this case. Though the problem can
be extended to three dimensions for practical use, we consider only two dimesions
(n = 2) in this thesis. Thus, the state vector xk represents both the position pk ∈ R2
and velocity vk ∈ R2 at the kth discrete time step, such that xk = (pTk , vTk )T . The














where pk,1 and pk,2 are the position in the horizontal and vertical dimensions, respec-
tively. Also, similar notation holds for the velocity vk and acceleration uk. Without
loss of generality, we can assume N , the last time period, is a fixed integer. Thus,
along the entire horizon Th = tN − t0, we can summarize these variables
x , (xT0 , ..., x
T
k , ..., x
T
N)
T ∈ X ⊆ R4(N+1)
u , (uT0 , ..., u
T
k , ..., u
T
N−1)
T ∈ U ⊆ R2N
where X is the Cartesian product of Xk, and U is the Cartesian product of Uk.
This notation for the state and control vectors, (x, u), will also later be extended
to a rolling-horizon in Chapter 4, where a sub-problem state vector x(h) and control
vector u(h) are found in each planning horizon h. Note that the size of the state
vector x contains both the position and velocity for all time steps, so is slightly more
than twice the size of the control vector u, which contains only the acceleration terms
at each time step, except the final step kN . The state and control domains, Xk and
Uk, are assumed to be non-empty, convex and compact sets which include boundary
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conditions [28]. For example, the initial conditions give X0 = xIC , where xIC is the
known starting position and velocity. The maximum acceleration (due to thrust,
drag, inherently due to thrust capacity, drag, bouyancy, etc.) is captured in Uk. It is
sufficient then to consider the discrete-time, finite-horizon, optimal control problem,
which we presently define for a specific case.
2.2 Two-Dimensional Optimal Trajectory for a Single UUV
2.2.1 Goal Function
Consider the simple path-planning problem for a single “attacker” vehicle rep-
resented as a point mass in two dimensions (n = 2), seeking an optimal trajectory
to a known target position pG(k) in an environment with obstacles that restrict
movement. Let W denote the workspace of our system, which contains all possible
vehicle configurations, X ⊆ W , in addition to a set of obstacles O ⊆ W , whose
locations and dimensions are subject to uncertainty. In Chapter 4, the obstacle
size and locations can vary from the expected configuration, which will necessitate
finding a robust feasible region.
Assuming that a path exists, our goal is to determine a state and control se-
quence (x, u) that ensures safe navigation from the initial state xIC to its target state
xG, while minimizing a cost functional J(x, u) =
∑N
k=0 fG(xk, uk), (2.1a), subject to
initial conditions xIC (2.1b), linear dynamics (2.1c), state and control bounds (2.1d)-
(2.1e), and avoiding collision with Nobs obstacles O(1), ...,O(m), ...,O(Nobs) ∈ O. We
14





in which ‖ · ‖ is the L2-norm, and thus convex and continuously differentiable in
the decision variables. We call fG the “goal function”— the straight line distance
between the vehicle’s target pG(k) and its position pk.
2.2.2 Linear Dynamics
A feasible path needs to satisfy physical dynamics, as well as bounds on ve-
locity, vmax(k), and acceleration, amax(k), due to a combination of vehicle-platform
characteristics and environmental conditions. Though vehicle dynamics are typi-
cally nonlinear, they can be linearized via second-order Taylor expansion of positon
p(t) and first-order expansion of velocity v(t) with respect to time t [26]. Since we
assume the relationships of position, velocity and acceleration to be ṗ(t) = v(t) and
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0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0






















= Axk +Buk (2.1c)




1 0 ∆t 0
0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0














If extended to 3-d space (n = 3), the matrix dimensions would be A ∈ R6×6 and
Bk ∈ R6×3.
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2.2.3 State and Control Bounds
We consider only convex sets of feasible controls and velocities, meaning that
there is no minimum absolute speed vmin or acceleration amin. Established methods
do exist for dealing with non-convex control constraints via “lossless convexification”
[27] [26], but these are beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, the convex velocity















While in reality obstacles may be non-convex, they can typically be approxi-
mated and/or decomposed as the union of convex obstacles [44]. Thus, we assume
that the obstacles O(m) are convex sets with non-empty relative interior, and can be
represented
O(m) = {p ∈ W : ||p− cm(k)|| ≤ rm(k)};
where cm(k) ∈ W and rm(k) are, respectively, the center and radius of obstacle m
at the kth time step, and ‖ · ‖ is the L2 Euclidean norm. This is a simplified circular
representation of an obstacle of general shape and size as described in [44]. By
modeling obstacles as balls rather than polygons, we can avoid the use of polytopic
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constraints that are often dealt with via binary variables in mixed integer programs
[32]. As depicted in Figure 2.1, the obstacles O restrict subsets of the state space
X , introducing non-convexity via an obstacle-avoidance constraint
1
2




with a concave, left-hand side with respect to the vehicle position due to being
bounded below.
Figure 2.1: UUV Workspace with Circular Obstacles
2.2.5 Optimal Trajectory Problem
By combining our objective function, linear dynamics, state and control con-
straints, the discrete-time, finite-horizon, optimal control problem is given by the
18













x0 = xIC (2.1b)













2 ∀ k = 0, ..., N − 1 (2.1e)
1
2
∥∥pk − cm(k)∥∥2 ≥ 1
2
rm(k)
2 ∀ k ∈ K,m ∈M (2.1f)
where the parameters vmax, amax, cm, and rm are subject to change over time, K =
{0, ..., N} and M = {1, ..., Nobs}. Changes in vmax and amax may be due to wa-
ter conditions (density, temperature, etc.) or imposed by a human operator, while
changes in obstacle size rm and position cm can be updated based on improvements
in resolution as the vehicle maps its environment. We address changes in the latter
parameters in Chapter 4, when we investigate robust obstacles. However, through-
out this chapter, we consider only stationary targets (i.e., pG(k) = pG,∀k), static
obstacles (i.e. cm(k) = cm,∀k and rm(k) = rm,∀k), and constant bounds on velocity
(vmax(k) = vmax,∀k) and acceleration (amax(k) = amax,∀k). Note that this formula-
tion differs slightly from the majority of the literature, in that it does not impose a
final state constraint xN = xF as is typically done in optimal control problems. This
is an important nuance, in that unlike the minimum-fuel problem fu(xk, uk) = ‖uk‖
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or minimum-time problem fT (xk, uk) = 1 as in [25], there is no guarantee that the
vehicle reaches its destination state. For reference, fu determines an optimal solu-
tion with respect to energy consumption, while fT finds the shortest feasible travel
time tN to reach a final state xF .
In its current form (a quadratically-constrained, quadratic program), the op-
timal trajectory problem (2.1) can be solved by using many standard constrained
nonlinear program solvers such as fmincon in MATLAB, CPLEX in AIMMS, or
CONOPT in GAMS, though only necessarily to local optima, as has been covered
extensively in the current literature [44]. Furthermore, the quality and feasibility of
this solution is known to be highly dependent on an initial guess, which can some-
times be difficult to compute. While not ideal since it does not offer an obstacle-free
initial trajectory, we implement an elementary, yet efficient, “warm-start” by solving
(2.1) without the non-convex obstacle constraints (2.1f), which renders the problem
convex. Algorithm 1 describes the sequence by which the trajectory optimization
NLP (2.1) finds a trajectory from initial state xIC to its target pG. We now turn
our attention to game theory to find equilibrium solution(s) to the same problem,
which will allow us to consider multiple, non-cooperative players.
2.3 Game Theory Background
The focal area of this research is to generate a simulated “perfect-information
reality,” against which current UUV path-planning models can be validated. Game
theory is ideal for this concept, since it can be used to simulate multiple indepen-
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Algorithm 1 Goal-Focused Trajectory NLP
Input: initial state xIC , target point pG, max velocity vmax, max acceleration amax,
obstacle data O, dynamics matrices A and B, step size ∆t, max steps N .
Output: x, u
1: while goal = 0 do
2: Solve (2.1) without obstacle constraint (2.1f)
3: (x, u)← (x̄, ū) . set initial guess
4: Solve full NLP (2.1) with obstacle avoidance
5: for k ← 0 to N do
6: if ‖p(k) − pG‖ < εG then
7: goal = 1, F = k
8: (x, u)← (xT0 , ..., xTF , uT0 , ..., uTF )T . Completion time step F ≤ N
9: else




dently controlled vehicles, and whose decisions and rewards can be impacted by
current or previous decisions made by all other vehicles in the system, or a subset
thereof.
2.3.1 Game Theory Overview
We use game theory to model multiple agents, each acting in its own best
interest (i.e., non-cooperatively), subject to the dynamics, state and control con-
straints described above, but whose payoff and feasible region also depends on the
strategies taken by some or all of the other players. The terms “vehicle,” “agent,”
and “player” are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
Prior to converting the UUV trajectory problem into a game, we need to
define players, strategies and outcomes. Players are individual decision makers
(individuals, teams, nations, or vehicles/vessels in this case) who can take action
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based on a set of possible strategies. In this thesis, we denote the set of NI players
P = {P1, ...Pi, ...,PNI}
where each player has a set of possible strategies given by Si.
The particular strategy taken by player Pi for a single horizon is denoted
s[i] ∈ Si. For the current trajectory optimization problem, the strategy for Pi is
defined by
s[i] := (x[i], u[i]),
where (x[i], u[i]) ∈ X × U represents the state and control vectors as defined previ-




is the Cartesian product,
is a continuous set of possibilities. Given the infinite state space inherent to under-
water navigation, these sets of strategies become extremely large and impossible to
enumerate explicitly.
Modifying the notation from (2.1), the objective, or payoff, for player Pi is
now J [i](s) if s ∈ S is the joint strategy chosen by all players.
In a single-stage equilibrium, each independent agent, or player, knows exactly
the state and control sequence of not only itself, but of all other players that influence
its objective across the entire time horizon. This changes, however, when we consider
the rolling-horizon case in Chapter 4, in which players can exhibit learning behavior
through updated policies in their respective objective functions.
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2.3.2 Nash Equilibrium
A set of joint strategies (s̄1, ..., s̄i, ..., s̄NI) ∈
∏
i∈I Si is said to be a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) if no player would find it beneficial to deviate provided that
all other players do not deviate from their strategies played at the NE outcome.
Formally, for every player Pi ∈ P , in which the cost functional J [i] is to be minimized,
J [i](s̄i, s̄−i) ≤ J [i](si, s̄−i) ∀si ∈ Si,
where s−i represents the strategies of all players other than Pi [16]. In other words,
s̄i ∈ Si is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for every player i, s̄i ∈ Si is the best-
case strategy when s̄−i ∈ S−i [16]. We leverage the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality
conditions for each player’s optimization problem to find such an equilibrium.
2.3.3 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
To find equilibrium points across the planning horizon, we can first put the




s.t gi(x) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I = 1, ...,m (λi) (2.2b)
hj(x) = 0 ∀j ∈ J = 1, ..., p (µj) (2.2c)
where λi and µj are the Lagrange multipliers for the i
th inequality constraint and
jth equality constraint, respectively [4]. A KKT point is a triple (x∗, λ∗, µ∗) where
23







µ∗j∇hj(x∗) = 0 (2.3a)
gi(x
∗) ≤ 0, λ∗i ≥ 0, λ∗i gi(x∗) = 0 ∀ i = 1, ...,m (2.3b)
hj(x
∗) = 0, µ∗j free ∀ j = 1, ..., p (2.3c)
The KKT conditions are necessary if a constraint qualification holds [2]. They are




3.1 Single-Vehicle Trajectory Equilibrium
Now we can apply the equilibrium methodology to the UUV formulation, first
by putting the problem in standard form as described in (2.3). Note that in our
original problem, (2.1a)-(2.1f) are intentionally squared and halved to simplify the
next steps in finding KKT points without loss of accuracy in the program due to the
norms being non-negative, monotonically increasing functions. In standard form,











∥∥∥pG − pk∥∥∥2 (3.1a)
s.t.
h0(x0, u0) ,x0 − xIC = 0 (µ0) (3.1b)

















∥∥pk − cm∥∥2) ≤ 0 ∀ k ∈ K,m ∈M (λkm) (3.1f)
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where the sets K and M represent the time and obstacle indices, respectively. The
Lagrange multipliers are represented by the Greek letters contained in (·) adjacent
to their corresponding primal constraints. The inequality multipliers are all one-
dimensional, but µk ∈ R4 is a vector of the same dimensions as the state vector
xk for the linear equality constraints. Meanwhile, since the cost functional J(x, u)
depends on both the state vector x and control vector u, the multipliers for (3.1a)
∀k ∈ K are xk ∈ R4 and uk ∈ R2.
3.1.1 Trajectory Problem in Expanded Vector Form
We can expand the squared norms found in (3.1) and retain the position and






∥∥∥pG − xk∥∥∥2 = 1
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(pTk Ipk + p
T
GIpG), (3.2a)























∥∥pk − cm∥∥2) = 1
2
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r2m − cTmIcm − pTk Ipk
)
+ pTk Icm (3.2e)
where Ah is a square block-diagonal matrix of rank 2n(N + 1) that represents
the state coefficients from (3.1c), in which the identity matrix I4×4 is the implied
coefficient for xk, and Bh is a non-square 2n(N + 1) × n(N + 1) matrix providing
the control coefficients, where 04×2 is the implied coefficient for uk. Thus, Ah and









. . . . . . 04×4









. . . . . . 04×2
04×2 · · · −B 04×2

. (3.3)
where the submatrices −A and −B are the negatives of the 4 × 4 A and 4 × 2 B
matrices defined in Section 2.2. The vector b = [xTIC , 0, ..., 0]
T includes the initial
condition from equation (3.1b), which fixes the initial state x0 to the known initial
position and velocity at k = 0. Given a function that has the form f(x) = 1
2
xTMx
whose matrix M = MT (symmetric), it can be shown that ∇f(x) = Mx. Also,
given the linear nature of the dynamic equations, we know that ∇xh = AT , while
∇uh = BT . Therefore our problem has the following KKT conditions:
∀ time steps k ∈ K :
∇kL(x, u) ,∇fG(xk, uk) +∇hk(xk, uk)µk + σk∇gvelk (xk, uk) (3.4a)
+ νk∇gacck (xk, uk) +
∑
m∈M
λkm∇gobskm(xk, uk) = 0 , xk, uk free
hk(x, u) = 0 , µk free . (3.4b)
gvelk (xk, uk) ≤ 0 ⊥ σk ≥ 0 (3.4c)
gacck (xk, uk) ≤ 0 ⊥ νk ≥ 0 (3.4d)
gobskm(xk, uk) ≤ 0 ⊥ λkm ≥ 0 ∀ m ∈M (3.4e)
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Suppose we have a function f := f(xk, uk) that is continuous and differentiable with
respect to both xk and uk. Although some components of f may only explicitly be
a function of the state vector and others a function of the control, for uniformity
and clarity, we can define ∇f(xk, uk) to be the component-wise partial derivative












where ∇f ∈ X × U ⊆ R6. We will apply this to an illustrative example below.
3.1.2 KKT Points Derivation
To construct the Lagrangian derivative (3.4a), we now address each term. The
gradient of the “goal” objective function (3.2a) is
∇kfG =
 ∇xk [−pTGIpk + 12(pTk Ipk + pTGIpG)]
∇uk [−pTGIpk + 12(p
T








 ∀k ∈ K, (3.5a)
so then the non-zero size of ∇kfG is of the same rank as pk ∈ R2. Now, the
gradients of the vehicle dynamics constraints (3.4b) need to be taken over the entire
time horizon since the variables of the previous time step k − 1 directly affect the
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variables in time step k
∇h =






where we can parse out the sub-matrices AT and BT to identify the gradients at











where only the blocks associated with time steps k and k + 1 are included in these
sub-matrices. Unlike the other Lagrange multipliers, µk ∈ R4 is a vector of the same




T )T , while























and for the last time step T , ∇hNµN = [(µpN)T , (µ
p
N)
T , 0]T .
The other constraints are more straight-forward, since there is no interaction
across time steps, and they are all scalars, rather than vectors. Thus, taking the
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 ∀k = 0, ..., T − 1. (3.5d)


















 , ∀k ∈ K,m ∈M (3.5e)
So replacing (3.4a) with the sum of (3.5a)-(3.5e), and combining with the comple-
mentary constraints (3.4b)-(3.4e), we can now determine the KKT point(s) for a
small example.
3.1.3 Illustrative KKT Example
To illustrate this concept, we consider the two-dimensional (n = 2) problem
with one time step (T = 1) in the horizon for one vehicle and one static obstacle
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(N = 1, Nobs = 1). The parameters for this system are defined in Table 3.1. The
obstacle information is condensed to O(m) = (cm,1, cm,2, rm)T for brevity.





xIC (0, 0, 0, 0)
T km





O(1) (4, 1, 2)T km
To show row-wise relationships within the Lagrangian derivative equation, we
temporarily separate the variable vectors into their physical dimensional compo-




T )]T , the control vec-
tor uk = [(uk,1)
T , (uk,2)




T )T , (µvk,2)
T ]T Thus, the derivative of the Lagrangian ∇Lk at
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µv0,1 − µv1,1 −∆tµ
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1,1




















































































The linear dynamics constraints hk(x, u)= xk − Axk−1 −Buk−1 − bk, each associ-
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22 − (42 + 12)− (p0,1)2 − (p0,2)2
)








22 − (42 + 12)− (p1,1)2 − (p1,2)2
)




3.1.4 Solving as a Mixed Complementarity Problem
We can solve such problems, as laid out in Section 3.1.3, as mixed comple-
mentarity problems (MCP), which generalize a system of nonlinear equations de-
termined through a nonlinear function F : Rnx × Rny → Rnx × Rny with lower and
upper bounds on variables [3], where an MCP for x ∈ Rnx , y ∈ Rny has the structure
0 ≤ Fx(x, y) ⊥ x ≥ 0
0 = Fy(x, y) , y free.






 , F (z) =





A key requirement to solving these types of problems to equilibrium as an MCP
is that the the problem is square (i.e., number of variables and number of equa-
tions matches). For instance, the data in the illustrative example above includes
eight state variables p0,1, p0,2, v0,1, v0,2, p1,1, p1,2, v1,1, v1,2 ⊆ x and four control vari-
ables u0,1, u0,2, u1,1, u1,2 ⊆ u with six inequality constraints (i.e. six multipliers) and
eight equality constraints (i.e. eight multipliers), for a total of 26 variables and 26
equations. We use the PATH solver in GAMS to solve these MCPs, in addition to
a MATLAB-GAMS interface.
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Figure 3.1 shows the path taken by the vehicle in the problem with simple
parameters where acceleration is neglected (i.e., the control matrix B is removed
from the dynamics constraints). This example provides visual validation of the
KKT solution procedure presented in this section. Recall the most well-known
“Pythagorean triple,” a right triangle with edge lengths having a ratio of 3-4-5 (e.g.,
two legs of length 3 and 4, and hypotenuse of length 5) [43]. Given the initial point
p0 = (0, 0)
T , target point pG = (9, 3)
T and maximum velocity vmax = 5 m/s, with
the obstacle centered at c1 = (4, 1) and radius r1 = 2, the reader can employ the
“3-4-5 rule” to observe the shortest path with obstacle-avoidance at the collocation
points over two time steps is uniquely p0 = (0, 0)
T , p1 = (4, 3)
T , p2 = (9, 3)
T . Note
Figure 3.1: Single vehicle path with two time steps
that the path violates the obstacle constraint between t = 0 and t = 1, which is
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mitigated with shorter time steps (∆t = 0.1) and more evaluations, as shown in
Figure 3.2. However, this increase in the number of time steps can quickly make the
problem intractable since we add six primal variables and at least seven (depends on
number of obstacles) constraints for every time step. Now, this does not guarantee
Figure 3.2: Single vehicle path with 10 time steps
a unique solution, but rather a local optimum when solved for a single vehicle.
3.2 Extension to the Pursuit-Evasion Game
Now that we have the tools to solve equilibrium problems, we can investi-
gate a somewhat more complex problem in addressing multi-agent, non-cooperative
games. Prior to formally defining our equilibrium problem, some useful notation
and definitions must be introduced. Let A denote the set of attacker UUV(s), and
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D denote the set of defender UUV(s). Thus, our player list is split such that
PA = {P1, ...Pi, ...,P|PA|}, PD = {P|PA|+1, ...Pi, ...,PNI}, PA,PD ⊆ P ,
PA ∩ PD = ∅, PA ∪ PD = P ,
where i = {1, ..., NI} is the vehicle index. For now, let |PA| = |PD| = 1, meaning
we only consider a two-player, non-cooperative game where PA = P1 and PD = P2.
This also requires an update in our variable and constraint notation, since both




k ∈ Xk, and are controlled in




k ∈ Uk for each time step k. Each vehicle is independently
subject to the same set of constraints described in (2.1). However, it is necessary to
modify their cost functions J [1](s) and J [2](s), where recall s = (s[1], s[2]) ∈ S is the
joint strategy chosen by all players.
3.2.1 Pursuit Function and Multi-Objective Equilibrium
The case study addressed in this thesis involves an attacker UUV P1 whose
mission it is to reach a stationary target position pG as quickly as possible, and a
defender UUV P2 whose mission it is to intercept said attacker before reaching the
target. This variant of the “pursuit-evasion game” (PEG) pictured in Figure 3.3
is inspired partially from the multi-pursuer game described in [42] and defender-
attacker-target game described in [41]. First, to account for multiple players simul-
taneously, the variable notation is updated so that Pi’s position at time step k in
dimension d is given by p
[i]
d,k, and likewise for its velocity v
[i]




Figure 3.3: Pursuit-Evasion Game Scenario
We define the “pursuit function”, fP which serves as the defender P2’s objective
















which the defender tries to minimize. The reader should note that this objective
function defines the defender more as a “surveillance asset” focused solely on the
attacker vehicle, rather than actually defending a particular point or area, as the
name implies. This results sometimes in the defender following behind the attacker
rather than taking the shortest path to intercept. Since the constraints are inde-
pendently enforced, the defender’s optimization problem minimizes (3.7a) subject
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k ∀ k = 0, ..., N − 1 (3.7c)
1
2







2 ∀ k = 0, ..., N − 1 (3.7e)
1
2
∥∥p[2]k − cm(k)∥∥2 ≥ 12rm(k)2 ∀ k ∈ K,m ∈M (3.7f)
which is solved for the defender P2. Meanwhile, the attacker P1 now seeks to min-
imize a multi-objective optimization problem with weighted competing objectives.
P1 retains the objective to reach its target point pG using the goal function, restated








‖pG − p[1]k ‖
2,
while it also simultaneously attempts to evade defender P1 (i.e., maximize the pur-
























where ωG, ωP ∈ [0, 1] are a weighting parameters and ωG + ωP = 1. The effects of
these two objectives on P1 are depicted visually in Figure 3.4. Note that the effects
Figure 3.4: Effects of weighted sub-objectives (ωG = ωP ) on Attacker P1





fG, respectively. The direction of each are determined based on relative

















Thus, summing the two vectors with respective coefficients gives us the cumulative
effect and velocity for PA
~vA = ωP~vP + ωG~vG.
The weighting parameters should be tuned based on scenario conditions, which is a
topic of discussion in Chapter 4, when the attacker may prioritize the goal function
over evasion if it is closer to the target than any defenders. Again, the attacker’s
trajectory is subject to the same constraints as previously stated.
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3.2.2 Two-player Game KKT Conditions
The KKT conditions for the two-player pursuit evasion game are constructed
similarly to the single-vehicle example (3.4), producing a larger system of equations
that encompasses both players simultaneously, such that:
∀ players Pi ∈ P , ∀ time steps k ∈ K :


























k ) = 0 , xk, uk free
hk(x
[i], u[i]) = 0 , µ
[i]
k free . (3.9b)
gvelk (x
[i]
k ) ≤ 0 ⊥ σ
[i]
k ≥ 0 (3.9c)
gacck (u
[i]
k ) ≤ 0 ⊥ ν
[i]
k ≥ 0 (3.9d)
gobskm(x
[i]
k ) ≤ 0 ⊥ λ
[i]
km ≥ 0 ∀ m ∈M (3.9e)
where the cost functionals J [i] for P1 and P2 are the weighted multi-objective func-
tion (3.8a) and pursuit function (3.7a), respectively. The gradient of P1’s cost
functional is
















 ∀k ∈ K, (3.10a)
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 ∀k ∈ K. (3.10b)
The remaining terms in each player Pi’s Lagrangian gradient (3.9a) corresponding to
each constraint remain the same as described for the single-vehicle example (3.5b)-
(3.5e).
3.2.3 Two-player Equilibrium Solution
This system of equations is solved simultaneously for both players to find
an equilibrium solution. To illustrate this, we consider a two-player, four obstacle
scenario with the parameters shown in Table 4.1. To make the equilibrium solution











IC (0, 10, 0, 0)
T m





O(1) (4, 1, 2)T m
O(2) (8, 6, 3)T m
O(3) (9, 0, 2.5)T m
O(4) (14, 5, 3)T m
clear, we describe the full expanded system of equations for the initial time steps k =
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0, 1, which can be extrapolated over the entire horizon. The Lagrangian derivatives








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































which are the first 24 rows of 612 Lagrangian equations (6 × 51 × 2) for this
scenario with N = 50 time steps and NI = 2 players. The linear dynamics equality
45
constraints for each player Pi , each associated with a free dual variable vector µ[i]0 ,

















































































































































































































































































































The complete system of equations in this scenario includes 1614 equations and 1614
variables (both primal and Lagrangian multipliers). The equilibrium trajectory
solution to such a pursuit-evasion game is depicted in Figure 5.1, where the attacker
reaches its target at time step k = 40 (i.e., time tk = 4 s). Figure 5.2 shows the
evolution of each player’s payoff over time.
The attacker is represented by the red diamond starting at (0, 0), while the
blue square represents the defender starting at (0, 10), with the target represented
by a green triangle at (17, 9), and circular obstacles throughout the work space. If
the defender fails to intercept the attacker directly, its objective function levels off
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Figure 3.5: Pursuit-Evasion Game Trajectory with one Defenders, one Attacker
Figure 3.6: Objective Values for one Defender, one Attacker PEG
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when the pursuer starts to follow the same path as the attacker since all vehicles
have the same max speed vmax in this scenario.
3.2.4 Nonlinear Program Post-Check
An important validation step in accepting the MCP solution is performing a
NLP post-check. The concept is to simply solve the same problem for each player
while holding the other player’s actions stationary as solved in the MCP. Thus, for
P1’s optimization problem, the state vector x[2] and control vector u[2] for P2 become
fixed, and vice-versa. The results of this post-check are shown in Table 3.3. The
Table 3.3: Two-Player PEG Results via MCP





columns match exactly, as they should, since the solution generated by the MCP
seems to satisfy KKT optimality conditions, implying at least a local optimum to




4.1 Definition of Rolling-Horizon Foresight
An alternative approach to solving the pursuit-evasion game as one large,
deterministic equilibrium problem is to use a rolling horizon, in which each vehicle
only has limited local information about the state space. The benefits to such an
approach are two-fold; in that computational costs per vehicle Pi are subject only
to the information it has available at the start of the planning horizon rather than
the entire workspace, and that our model more closely resembles actual operations
in which no agent is omniscient. Recall that each vehicle acts independently, and
so we continue to use the terms “player” and “vehicle” interchangeably.
Therefore, a master problem MP can be split into sub-problems SP1,...,
SPh,..., SPH , each of the form presented in Chapter 2. We split the time series
K into subsets of time indices defined as Kh = {k0(h), ..., kN(h)} ∈ K, where the
initial time step k0(h) = (h − 1)N and final step kN(h) = hN . This assumes an
equal number of time steps per horizon, and ensures that each planning horizon h
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includes exactly N + 1 collocation points, i.e.,
h = 1 : K1 = {0, ..., N}
h = 2 : K2 = {N, ..., 2N}
...
h = H : KH = {(H − 1)N, ..., HN}
where H is a finite maximum number of planning horizons to consider, and N
is the number of time steps in each horizon. Since each sub-problem is solved
independently, it is necessary to first define the sub-path trajectory vector x
[i]
(h) and
sub-path control vector u
[i]






k0 , ..., x
[i]T
k , ..., x
[i]T
kN )





k0 , ..., u
[i]T
k , ..., u
[i]T
kN−1)
T ∈ U ⊆ R2N ,




(h)), as well as the
joint set of strategies sh = (s
[i]
h ,∀i ∈ P) ∈ S(h)⊆ S. For bookkeeping purposes, we
also define a global trajectory X [i] and global control vector U [i] which denote the
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combined paths and control decisions for player Pi across all horizons
X [i] , (x[i]T(1) , x
[i]T
(2) , ..., x
[i]T




U [i] , (u[i]T(1) , u
[i]T
(2) , ..., u
[i]T




The transitions between planning horizons serve as continuity points, such that
the time index kN and state vector x
[i]
kN
at the end of one planning horizon are saved
as the initial conditions k0 and state vector x
[i]
k0




|h = x[i]k0|h+1). This concept is depicted visually in Figure 4.1, where N = 10 and
H = 5.
Figure 4.1: Rolling-Horizon Sub-Problem Concept with Continuity Points
Recall that the pursuit-evasion game presented in this thesis includes a distinct
set of attacker UUVs PA and another distinct set of defender UUVs PD; where in
the current chapter PA = {P1} and PD = {P2}. Also, the notation Pi, when used,
refers generally to any player in the system. For the purpose of this thesis, we
consider a scenario in which the attacker vehicle P1 has global information about
its own states x
[1]
k and target position pG, while the defender vehicle P2 has global




However, both vehicles only have “local” information about obstacles and
their adversaries. Here “local” is interpreted in terms of Euclidean distance from
the vehicle Pi’s position at the start of each rolling horizon, p[i]k0 . This leads us to
define a detection radius r
[i]
δ for each vehicle Pi, inside of which objects become local
information, and outside of which objects can be completely unknown or nominally
mapped as robust obstacles, which is presented in Section 4.2.1.
Note that with a rolling-horizon foresight, a vehicle Pi is prone to finding a
sub-path x
[i]
h that is locally optimal in the current horizon h, but that may result in
a globally sub-optimal path X [i] and control vector U [i] due to unforeseen obstacles
and adversaries outside its detection range.
4.1.1 Foresight and Safety
We assume in this case that the detection radius r
[i]
δ is always greater than the
travel range rh in each time horizon h, where rh is an implicit parameter defined
by the maximum velocity vmax and time horizon tN , such that rh = tNvmax. The
travel range is the maximum distance the vehicle can travel during a single planning
horizon h if it is already traveling at max speed (i.e., ‖vk0‖ = vmax), and does not












k ‖, ∀ h = 1, ..., H (4.1)
which determines a linear approximation of the physical sub-path length of x
[i]
(h),
or distance traveled, from the initial position x
[i]
k0





assumptions are also stated below in Assumption 4.1.
Assumption 4.1 (Sufficient Foresight) All vehicles Pi have a sufficient detec-
tion radius r
[i]
δ strictly greater than the travel range r
[i]
h , which, in turn, is always












which keeps the vehicle Pi from traveling beyond a range that it can detect obstacles
or other vehicles in any single planning horizon h. The relationship between rh and
r
[i]
δ is shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Rolling-Horizon Foresight with Obstacle Detection
The space between the detection radius (orange circle) and travel range (gray
circle) can be considered a safety buffer. The larger this region, the better foresight
the vehicle has beyond its physical travel capabilities. Note in the figure that the
54
sub-path x(h) does not consider the undetected obstacle outside rδ, and so the vehicle
has to adjust course in the next sub-path x(h+1).
4.1.2 Obstacle Detection
Given the definition for local information and detection above, we can define






− cm‖ ≤ rm + r[i]δ }, (4.2)
where 1{·} is an indicator function that “activates” the conditional obstacle avoid-
ance constraint for vehicle Pi and obstacle O(m) only if that obstacle boundary falls
within the detection radius (i.e., δ
[i]
(m) = 1). Thus, obstacles described in Section
2.2.4 become visible to player Pi via
O[i](m) , {δ
[i]
(m)p ∈ W : ||p− cm(k)|| ≤ rm}, (4.3)
which generates conditional obstacle avoidance constraint, gobskm(x
[i]
k ), ∀k ∈ Kh,m ∈
M [i] in Pi’s optimization in the same form as (3.1f) only if δ[i](m) = 1. The diagram
shown in Figure 4.3 describes how this is implemented. Note that the nearest point
on the surface of the first obstacle (top) is outside the detection area (i.e., beyond the
detection radius rδ from Pi’s initial position pk0), so that obstacle O(1) is undetected,
while O(2) (bottom) is detected in the current horizon.
The conditional constraint is included/excluded prior to the problem reach-
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Figure 4.3: Obstacle Detection Concept
ing the GAMS PATH solver, so that discrete binary variables can be avoided in
the MCP. Also, this algorithm implicitly induces a sort of “memorylessness” prop-
erty in our system, since vehicles do not store obstacle locations after they have
passed them. Although current vehicle platforms are capable of mapping and stor-
ing this type of information, doing so only induces unnecessary obstacle-avoidance
constraints in our model since vehicles tend not to backtrack in a shortest path to
a fixed target.
4.1.3 Vehicle Detection
Similarly, while obstacle detection impacts the number of constraints consid-
ered, vehicle detection affects the objective function, in that the pursuit function
f
[i]
Pk should only be an active sub-objective for player Pi in horizon h if player Pj’s
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− p[j]k0‖ ≤ r
[i]
δ }, ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., |P|}, i 6= j, (4.4)













Since each vehicle presumably has its own unique detection radius, r
[i]
δ based on
vehicle-platform, it is possible that Pi detects Pj before Pj detects Pi if r[i]δ < r
[j]
δ .





Assumption 4.2 (Detection Equity) All vehicles have the same detection ra-




i ∀i 6= j, so no advantage of information exists.
4.1.4 Rolling-Horizon Equilibrium Problem
By implementing vehicle and obstacle detection into the attacker vehicle P1’s
optimization problem (3.8a), we arrive at a new formulation in which P1 wants to
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minimize the cost functional J
[1]













ωG‖pG − p[1]k ‖




















k ∀ k = k0, ..., kN − 1 (4.6c)
1
2






a2max ∀ k = k0, ..., kN − 1 (4.6e)
1
2
∥∥p[1]k − cm∥∥2 ≥ 12r2m ∀ k ∈ Kh,m ∈M [1] (4.6f)
where M [1] is the set of obstacles currently detected by player P1,
M [1] , {m : δ[1](m) = 1} ⊆M,
and is updated each planning horizon.
Likewise, the defender P2 wants to minimize the cost functional J [2]h (sh) in
































k ∀ k = k0, ..., kN − 1 (4.7c)
1
2






a2max ∀ k = 0, ..., kN − 1 (4.7e)
1
2
∥∥p[2]k − cm∥∥2 ≥ 12r2m ∀ k ∈ Kh,m ∈M [2] (4.7f)





1 = 0, then player P1 minimizes J
[1]
h in (4.6) by simply moving towards
its target pG and player P2 minimizes J [2]h = 0 in (4.7) by remaining stationary.
This is visually demonstrated in Figure 4.4 in which rδ < ‖p[2]k0 − p
[1]
k0
‖, so P1 takes
a direct route from its initial position (0, 10) to its target (10, 0) and P2 remains at
(0, 0). However, if the detection radius is increased to rδ = 10 then the defender
P2 pursues P1, while the attacker P1 attempts to evade, resulting in capture just
before reaching the target, shown in Figure 4.5.
4.2 Incomplete Information
In underwater path planning, agents make decisions with incomplete infor-
mation. Thus, there are many extensions that could be further explored with the
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(a) Trajectories for 2-Player PEG (b) Cost Functions over Time
Figure 4.4: No Pursuit when rδ = 5 < ‖p[2]k0 − p
[1]
k0‖
rolling-horizon approach. For instance, a vehicle could only have partial information
about the size and location of obstacles, its target location and even its own posi-
tion due to the nature of its environment, where the GPS signal is either reduced
or unavailable [34]. For now, we maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 4.3 (Perfect Self-Awareness) Player Pi retains perfect current knowl-
edge of its own state x
[i]





m, about obstacles observed at the start of each horizon.
(a) Trajectories for 2-Player PEG (b) Cost Functions over Time




This assumption supposes that vehicles know their own position and velocity, but
may only possess partial information about obstacles (exogenous uncertainty) and/or
the effect of internal control on their vehicle dynamics (endogenous).
4.2.1 Interval Robustness
We now introduce the concept of robustness to our equilibrium model, which
can be interpreted to have a number of meanings. We first introduce a sensor
confidence parameter ρ[i] ∈ [0, 1] that defines the level of certainty vehicle Pi has
about its environment. So when ρ[i] = 0 the vehicle has no certainty about the actual
size and location of obstacles that it detects, while when ρ[i] = 1 it can navigate
with deterministic certainty. We then observe how the circular obstacles O can be
modified in the state space to efficiently account for interval robustness [22] in their
location and size parameters. This means that the centers and radii of obstacles can
fall within a permissible range around a nominal value. Then we incorporate this
concept with a rolling-horizon foresight.
4.2.2 Robust Obstacles
Robust obstacles are approached in a worst-case representation, where obstacle
attributes are stochastic, in that player Pi detects a nominal center ĉ[i]m and nominal
radii r̂
[i]
m that may vary from the actual values for each obstacle. The observed
nominal center ĉ
[i]
m and radius r̂
[i]
m reported by the vehicle sensor are known to vehicle
Pi, but the actual center realization cm may vary from the observed center within
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±∆cmax, and the actual obstacle radius rm may also vary by ±∆rmax, which are
defined:
∆c[i]max , (1− ρ[i])
(










where the numerator in (4.8a) reflects the distance from the vehicle’s sensor to the
surface of the obstacle. Dividing by twice the vehicle’s sensor range reduces the un-
certainty within the detection range. This function is closely related to the obstacle
avoidance constraint (3.7f). In (4.8b) the uncertainty is inversely proportional to
its proximity to the center cm, meaning that , for obstacles with large radii rm, the
closer it is to the obstacle, the wider the radius might vary. This gives the players
the definitions of their nominal obstacles
ĉ[i]m ,= cm + ∆c
[i] =






 , |∆c[i]1 |, |∆c[i]2 | ≤ ∆c[i]max (4.8c)
r̂[i]m , rm + ∆r
[i]
m, |∆r[i]m| ≤ ∆r[i]max, (4.8d)
which vary depending on each player’s confidence parameter ρ[i] and their respective
distances from each obstacle. The uncertainty can be mitigated using a finite num-
ber of scenarios to capture an infinite number of scenarios within these robustness
bounds. This is achieved by representing the obstacles as shown in Figure 4.6, where
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a larger effective radius r′m is generated around the outermost obstacle realizations










m is the observed nominal radius, and the second term represents the max-
imum change if either: a) both center coordinates shift maximally, ∆c1 = ∆c2 =
∆cmax (note: the coefficient
√
2 is the hypotenuse of a right triangle with legs of
length 1), or b) the radius shifts maximally, ∆r = ∆rmax. By replacing the infinite
number of potential realizations of obstacles within an acceptable range, this tech-
nique effectively and efficiently converts a stochastic problem into a deterministic
equivalent problem. This provides a robust path for player Pi via









∥∥p[i]k − ĉ[i]m∥∥2) ≤ 0 ∀ k ∈ Kh,m ∈M [i] (λ[i]km), (4.10)
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given that obstacles are sparsely distributed in the state-space, necessitating the
following assumption.
Assumption 4.4 (Sparse Obstacles) Separation between obstacles is greater than
each of their respective radii , and no set of obstacles are configured such that more
than half of any vehicle’s detection area is restricted. Thus, no two obstacles overlap
and are sparsely distributed.
However, since this is a highly conservative approach, the paths might become
sub-optimal relative to the path that would be selected given only the nominal
obstacles if uncertainty bounds stretch potential obstacles outside the radius of the
nominal obstacle. Also, modeling obstacles in this manner introduces potential for
artificial infeasibility, meaning that even if a feasible path exists through actual
obstacle realizations, the vehicle may fail to find it due to overlapping conservative
estimates.
4.3 Rolling-Horizon Robust Equilibrium
Combining the two concepts of rolling-horizon foresight and robust obstacles
produces a model that can represent a multi-player system with incomplete infor-
mation and learning, which is of value in the verification and validation of UUV
mission-planning algorithms and software. The KKT conditions for the rolling-
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horizon robust game for each horizon h now become:




































(h)) = 0 , µ
[i]
k free . (4.11b)
gvelk (x
[i]
k ) ≤ 0 ⊥ σ
[i]
k ≥ 0 (4.11c)
gacck (u
[i]
k ) ≤ 0 ⊥ ν
[i]
k ≥ 0 (4.11d)
grobkm(x
[i]
k ) ≤ 0 ⊥ λ
[i]
km ≥ 0 ∀ m ∈M
[i] (4.11e)
where the cost functional J
[i]











k ) are defined by (4.6a)-(4.6e) for P1 and by (4.7a)-(4.7e) for P2,
while robust obstacle avoidance constraints grobkm(x
[i]
k ) for each player Pi are defined
by (4.10). The procedure for finding the rolling-horizon robust equilibrium solution
for the two-player pursuit evasion game is summarized in Algorithm 2
4.3.1 Learning via Objective Weighting for Attacker P1
Learning behavior can be challenging to understand, let alone model in a
mathematical construct. However, using a rolling-horizon approach, we can imple-
ment an iterative learning mechanism. This is done for the attacker P1 by tuning
the objective weighting parameters for the goal function ωG and pursuit function
ωP based on proximity and relative position to the target and defender P2. If, for
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Algorithm 2 Rolling-Horizon Robust Equilibrium
Input: P1 data (x[1]IC ,pG,vmax,amax,ωG), P2 data (x
[2]
IC ,vmax,amax), obstacle data O,
confidence level ρ, detection range rδ, dynamics matrices A and B, step size ∆t,
horizon length Th, max horizons H
Output: X [i], U [i] ∀i = 1, 2, result, residual
1: for h← 1 to H do









(h)) ∀i = 1, 2 . set initial guess
4: O[i](m) ← (ĉ
[i]
m
T , r[i]′m) via (4.2),(4.8c),(4.9) . update robust obstacles
5: Find full KKT solution via (4.11).
6: for k ← k0 to kN do . check termination criteria
7: if ‖p[1]k − pG‖ < εG then
8: result = 1, kN ← k . attacker reached target
9: return
10: end if
11: if ‖p[2]k − p
[1]
k ‖ < εC then





instance, P1 is positioned between the target pG and defender P2 at the start of a
planning horizon, and no other defenders are present, then the most appropriate
objective weights would be ωG = 1, ωP = 0, or to maximize the goal function fG.
Recall P1’s explicit objective to reach the target pG as quickly as possible without
being intercepted by P2, so this adjustment makes sense as long as no obstacles are
present between P1’s starting position p[1]k0 and its target pG.
While the full goal function weight works when P1 has a clear path to pG,
there are other scenarios in which the pursuit function outweighs the goal function
(ωP > ωG) provides better opportunity to P1. Consider the game with the follow-
ing parameters which generates the scenario pictured in Figure 4.7. Note that P2
captures P1 at t = 0.9 when P1’s objective is equally weighted with ωG = ωP = 0.5.
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Table 4.1: Learning Game Parameters
Parameter Value Units Description
t0 0 h start time
∆t 0.1 h time step
Th 2 h horizon length
x
[1]
IC (0, 0, 0, 0)
T km P1 initial state
x
[2]
IC (3, 4, 0, 0)
T km P2 initial state
xG (10, 0, 0, 0)
T km target point
vmax 5 km/h max speed
amax 20 km/h
2 max acceleration
O(1) (5,−1, 2)T km obstacle data
ωG 0.5 goal obj weight
(a) Trajectories for 2-Player PEG (b) Cost Functions over Time
Figure 4.7: Balanced Objective, ωG = ωP = 0.5. Capture at t = 0.9
In the same scenario, since P1 is closer to P2 than the target pG, if its objective
is heavily weighted towards evasion (i.e., maximizing the pursuit function fP ), it puts
itself in a position to reach its goal state pG during the first of two sub-paths, as
shown in in Figure 4.8. However, maintaining these objective weights in the second
horizon starting at the terminal point denoted by the small red circle between the
obstacle and the target in Figure 4.8a , P1 overshoots the target pG and is instead
captured at t = 3.4. This shows why the attacker might want to modify its objective
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(a) Trajectories for 2-Player PEG (b) Cost Functions over Time
Figure 4.8: Evasion-weighted Objective, ωG = 0.25, ωP = 0.75. Capture at t = 3.4
weights (i.e., learn) between planning horizons based on the scenario.
4.3.2 Learning via Robust Obstacles
By our definition of local information, only obstacles that player Pi can see
should be represented by their nominal values ĉm and r̂m. However, we can give
the vehicles some information about future obstacles in the form of robust obsta-
cles, and update the uncertainty bounds as it gets closer (e.g., as it gathers some
information about the environment). In practice, this might look like the effective
radii r[i]′m of obstacles shrink as Pi approaches them, which is how we want it to
conservatively conduct its path planning to maximize chances of a feasible strategy
(X,U). The information about the robust-effective obstacles update each planning
horizon, although the actual obstacles remain static. The effective radii r[i]′m , as
defined by (4.9), provide a buffer around obstacles, the size of which is a function of
the vehicle’s proximity to the actual obstacle. An illustrative example in which the
vehicle navigates around the effective obstacles which as shown in Figure 4.9, with
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Table 4.2: Robust Navigation Parameters
Parameter Value Units Description
t0 0 s start time
∆t 0.2 s time step
Th 10 s horizon length
x
[1]
IC (5, 20, 0, 0)
T m P1 initial state
xG (55, 10, 0, 0)
T m target point





δ 30 m detection range
ρ 0.7 confidence level
O(1) (12, 20, 4)T m obstacle data
O(2) (22, 15, 2)T m obstacle data
O(3) (45, 15, 5)T m obstacle data
O(4) (30, 25, 1)T m obstacle data
relevant parameters listed in Table 4.2. In Figure 4.9, the green circles represent
the actual obstacles O(m), while the red filled areas represent the detected nominal
obstacles Ô[1](m), and the outer red rings represent the robust effective radius r[1]′m
around each nominal obstacle that the vehicle implements in its obstacle avoidance
constraints. Note that in Sub-figure 4.9b, the furthest obstacle O4 is undetected,
while the effective radii for near obstacles is close to their nominal radii (resolution
is inversely proportional to proximity). Later, in Sub-figure 4.9c, the effective radius
for O1 becomes larger since it is near the edge of the vehicle’s detection range.
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(a) Detected Obstacles in horizon h = 1 (b) Detected Obstacles in horizon h = 2
(c) Detected Obstacles in horizon h = 3
(d) Navigation through actual obstacles
Figure 4.9: Learning via Robust Obstacle Updates
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Chapter 5
Game Expansion and Simulations for V&V
The previous chapters laid the foundation for equilibrium solutions to a two-
player, pursuit-evasion game with robust obstacle avoidance and a stationary target.
This provides a valuable benchmarking method of unmanned underwater vehicle
(UUV) trajectory- and mission-planning. While the two-player model can be useful
in safe trajectory validation, we can also modify this framework to model larger
systems of UUVs for the validation of decoupled multi-vehicle mission plans (i.e.,
war-gaming) for current and future real-world applications.
In this chapter, we: 1) improve upon the current model by adding a minimum
energy function to each player’s cost functional, 2) introduce a system with multiple
defenders, 3) explore the robustness of the current equilibrium model via Monte
Carlo simulation, 4) compare to the non-linear programming time-optimal trajectory
with deterministic obstacles and dynamics in single- and rolling-horizon scenarios,
5) discuss validation through equilibrium solutions.
5.1 Vehicle Platform
For the remaining simulations in this thesis, we utilize vehicle parameters from
the Bluefin-21 Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (BPAUV)
[36], with the following relevant specifications. This platform is designed specifically
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Table 5.1: Bluefin-21 UUV Specifications
Parameter Value Units Description
Thmax 18 h endurance @ 3 kts
vmax 2 m/s (approx. 4 kts) max speed
rδ 150 m sensor range (low resolution)
for U.S. Navy mine countermeasures (MCM) in shallow water, though has applica-
tions in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), which is most closely related to this study.
The Bluefin-21 UUV serves as the basis for the Navy’s Knifefish and Black Pearl
UUVs currently being used and developed for research in both MCM and ASW.
5.2 Minimum-Energy Function
Upon introducing the vehicle detection concept in Chapter 4, it was discovered
that the defender P2 consistently sought to find the origin at (0, 0) when P1 was not
within detection range r
[2]
δ . Without the conditional pursuit sub-objective in the
cost functional for P2’s optimization, the mixed complementarity problem (MCP)
solution forced P2 to approach the origin. To mitigate the issue of unnecessary
travel, we introduce a variant of the minimum-fuel objective commonly used in









2 ∀ k = 1, ..., N − 1, (5.1)
which is applied to each player’s cost functional with an objective weighting pa-
rameter ωE, which should be kept small (order of 10
−3). Combining this with the
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ωG‖pG − p[1]k ‖





























The constraints remain the same, so this addition to the cost functional for each
player only affects the MCP solution in the Lagrangian derivative with respect to
the control variables as originally described in (3.5). The first two terms of the cost
functional remain unchanged, while the last term is added in the rows pertaining to
control variables u
[i]
k in horizon h, so the gradient of the cost functional (3.5a) for
player P1 now becomes:























 ∀k ∈ K, (5.4)
where the first term is the gradient with respect to P1’s state at each time step x[1]k









(−fP ); and the final term is the gradient with respect to control at
each time step u
[1]
k of the energy function, ∇u[1]k fE.
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Similarly for player P2, the pursuit function term of the cost functional does
not change, but the minimal control sub-function is added. Now the gradient of the

















 ∀k ∈ K, (5.5)
where the first term is the gradient with respect to P2’s state at each time step x[2]k




fP ; and the second term is the gradient with respect to
control at each time step u
[2]
k of the energy function, ∇u[2]k fE.
5.3 Multiple-Defender, Single-Attacker Game
Building on the concepts presented in Section 3.2, we can extend the pursuit-
evasion game to a system with more than one defender. So now let the number of
attackers |PA| = 1 and the number of defenders |PD| ≥ 1, meaning we now consider
a (1+ |PD|)-player, non-cooperative game where the set of attackers PA = {P1} and
the set of defenders PD = {P2, ...Pj, ...,PNI}. This allows us to investigate much
larger, more complex problems, but we need to modify the attacker cost functional
J
[1]
h (s(h)), while also adjusting the rolling-horizon detection variables δ
[j]
1 |j∈D for each
defender to allow decoupled detection and control. In addition, since there are now
teams of defenders (though still non-cooperative), a new friendly collision avoidance
constraint (5.8f) needs to be added to the defenders’ optimization problems.
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The updated scenario involves an attacker UUV P1 whose mission it is to reach
a stationary target position pG as quickly as possible, but now a team of defender
UUVs PD whose mission it is to intercept said attacker before reaching the target.
Recall the pursuit function from (4.5) for any pair of players Pi and Pj at each time
















1 = 1, where
the detection equity assumption (4.2) still holds.
5.3.1 Attacker-Optimization Problem
With the addition of defenders, the evasion sub-objective in the attacker P1’s
optimization problem needs to be normalized so that the total evasion weight re-
mains equal to ωP . To do so, we introduce the term ND, which represents the
number of defenders Pj∈D detected by the attacker P1. Thus, the second term of
P1’s cost functional considers the weighted average of the evasion functions for P1
as it interacts with each of the defenders Pj∈D. This results in the modified cost
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∥∥p[1]k − ĉ[1]m∥∥2) ≤ 0 ∀ k ∈ K,m ∈M [1] (λ[1]km) (5.7e)
where the state and control dynamics matrices A and B are as defined in (3.3), and
the Greek symbols in (·) are the Lagrange multipliers for each constraint for P1. This
is a weighted multi-objective quadratic program subject to quadratic constraints.
5.3.2 Defender-Optimization Problem
Now with multiple defenders, two items need to be addressed with respect
to their optimization problems within the game scenario. First, we restate the






− p[j]k0‖ ≤ r
[i]
δ }, ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., |P|}, i 6= j, (4.4)
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which is now generalized across all players Pi and Pj, i 6= j. Each player updates its
detection variable for all other players, and we assume in this study that defenders
do not share information about the attacker’s state.
Assumption 5.1 (Decoupled Detection) Defenders that detect an attacker do
not share information about the attacker’s state with the other defenders, i.e., δ
[i]
1 = 1
does not imply δ
[j]
1 = 1 ∀j 6= i ∈ D.
Though underwater communication capabilities for cooperative teams of robots ex-
ist, the latency (time delay) of acoustic signals for data transfer present compli-
cations in real-time information sharing [1], necessitating the current research in
decoupled/decentralized control [7].
Now, the defenders also need to ensure friendly collision avoidance with one-
another, which requires the definition of a safety distance parameter dsafe, which
can be interpreted as a circle around each defender [44]. Formally, this introduces














≤ 0 ∀ k ∈ K, i, j ∈ D, i 6= j, (5.8f)
where both Pi and Pj are defender vehicles in this case, and γ[i]j again is defined as
in (4.4), so the constraint is only enforced if the players detect one-another.





















































































≤ 0 ∀ k ∈ K, i 6= j ∈ D (ψ[j]ik ) (5.8f)
where each defender Pj∈D pursues the attacker P1 while avoiding both obstacles
and other defenders Pi∈D within its detection range r[j]δ . The cost functional (5.8a)
includes the pursuit function if γ
[j]
1 = 1 and minimum fuel sub-function as de-
scribed by (5.3). The linear dynamics constraints, velocity and acceleration bounds
(5.8b)-(5.8d) remain unchanged and generalize to all defenders. Both the obstacle
avoidance (5.8e) and friendly collision avoidance constraints (5.8f) are conditional,
in that (5.8e) is enforced if m ∈M [j] and (5.8f) is enforced relative to Pi if γ[j]i = 1.
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5.3.3 Equilibrium Solution to a Multi-Defender, Single-Attacker Game
The equilibrium trajectory solution to a two-defender, single-attacker pursuit-
evasion game is depicted in Figure 5.1, where the attacker reaches its target at time
tk = 20.8 s). Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of each player’s relevant sub-objectives
over time.
Figure 5.1: Pursuit-Evasion Game with two Defenders, one Attacker
The defenders’ pursuit functions level off when the pursuers follow the same
path as the attacker since all vehicles have the same max speed vmax in this scenario.
Important to note in this formulation is that each individual vehicle operates in its
own best interest, meaning that even if there are two defenders with the same
objective to intercept an attacker, they operate independently.
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Figure 5.2: Objective Values for two Defender, one Attacker PEG
5.4 Verification of Effective Obstacles
The robust effective obstacle representation described in Chapter 4 is conser-
vative, but still requires verification that the vehicles select feasible paths regardless
of how the obstacles appear as nominal detected obstacles. This means that the ef-
fective obstacles must account for an infinite number of potential detected obstacles
with nominal center ĉm and radius r̂m within the intervals for ∆cm and ∆rm that are
expected based on actual obstacle realizations. To verify that the vehicles choose
a safe path via the robust effective radii r′m about detected centers ĉm, we imple-
ment a Monte Carlo simulation of a vehicle attempting to reach a stationary target
pG by navigating around 100 potential orientations of a single obstacle. We define
success as the vehicle reaching the target without violating the obstacle avoidance
constraint. Running the simulation for rm = 10, 20, and 30 m with horizon lengths
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Th = 60, 45, and 30 seconds, we can observe what configurations cause errors in the
robust obstacle approach. These errors are measured by the residual values gener-
ated by the GAMS PATH solver, which are on orders smaller than 10−6 when a safe
trajectory is found, but reflect numbers larger than 1 when the resulting trajectory
is infeasible. Table 5.2 describes the results.



















*KKT point (i.e., viable solution)
It becomes clear that even using the robust obstacle approach, vehicles can
encounter situations where they struggle to choose a direction around an obstacle,
particularly when they are close to the surface of an obstacle and their target lies
directly on the opposite side. When the vehicle’s starting position, the obstacle
center and target lie on the same line, the vehicle does not prioritize either direction
and collides with the obstacle. This scenario seems to be most common when
the planning horizon is short (say Th = 30 sec) and a horizon terminal point xkN
lands directly in front of the obstacle. In practice, this scenario is highly unlikely
with random obstacles, and even incremental shifts from the line allow significant
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improvement in performance (moving the obstacle down 0.5 meters in the case where
rm = 30, Th = 30 in this example improves the success rate to 89%).
5.5 Numerical Verification of KKT Stationary Points
Another aspect of this model that is important to verify is under what condi-
tions the model fails to generate a solution. There are potential situations in which
the MCP is insufficient for the current formulation, specifically when the KKT op-
timality conditions do not hold. These scenarios have been seen to arise when the
cost functional for the attacker P1 becomes non-convex, which we investigate via




IC and targets pG,
we identify the effect of objective weights, specifically the goal weight ωG on the
success rate (i.e., relative frequency of generating a viable solution) of the game. By
removing obstacles and simulating a two-player game over 1000 replications, while
only varying ωG, a trend emerges that sheds light on the cost functional J
[1] for
the attacker P1, which for two players is given by (5.2). This cost functional is a
convex-concave combination which P1 seeks to minimize. Figure 5.3 illustrates the
relationship between the attacker’s cost functional J [1] and ωG, where the box plots
represent the quartiles for J [1] at each weight, and each red “+” is considered an
outlier. The gray shaded region (J [1] < 0) depicts when a KKT point is unlikely to
be found.
Recall that the pursuit function weight ωP = 1 − ωG, so the negative values
of J [1] when ωG ≤ 0.4 is actually intuitive since the concave pursuit function is
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Figure 5.3: Verification of when KKT conditions hold
more heavily weighted in these scenarios, causing the overall cost functional to
become concave. Thus, we identify a limitation in the formulation that the convex
components of each player’s cost functional (e.g., fG, fE) must outweigh the concave
components (e.g. fP for P1) such that J [i](s) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I in order for the KKT










ωG‖pG − p[1]k ‖





2 + ωE‖u[1]k ‖
2
)
can concretely describe how the pursuit function affects the reliability of KKT op-
timality. For instance, the Hessian matrix of second derivatives of J
[1]
h for this game
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with simple horizon where N = 1(k = 0, 1) is:
H =

ωG − ωPγ[1]2 0 0 0 ωPγ
[1]
2 0
0 ωG − ωPγ[1]2 0 0 0 ωPγ
[1]
2
0 0 ωE 0 0 0
0 0 0 ωE 0 0
ωPγ
[1]









































It can be determined that no combination of ωG and ωP (except when ωG = 1,
ωP = 0) exist such that all eigenvalues are non-negative, so we cannot claim the
KKT conditions are sufficient for this cost functional. However, the simulated results
imply that they are often necessary to find stationary equilibrium points, especially
when ωG ≥ ωP . Figure 5.4 shows the success rate (i.e., equilibrium point being
found) for 2000 independent simulations varying ωG ∈ [0.1, 1] and ωE = 0.001, 0.005.
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Note that the numerically derived success rate for ωG ≥ 0.5 is 100%. From these
Figure 5.4: Success Rate of Two-player Game with no obstacles
simulations, we observe a positive correlation between KKT point being found (i.e.
residuals < 10−6) and a non-negative attacker cost functional J [1]. However, there
exist scenarios (5% of a 2000-simulation sample set) for which a stationary point
can be found despite a negative cost functional. This relates to the fact that KKT
conditions are not sufficient for this convex-concave cost functional.
5.6 Game Theoretic Validation for UUV Trajectories
The model presented in this thesis generates a solution to a pursuit-evasion
game with a closed-loop information pattern with rolling-horizon foresight. Closed-
loop information provides the “perfect-information reality” for game theoretic vali-
dation, in that each player Pi∈I can simultaneously adjust its strategy for the current
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horizon based on the state of the rest of the system [19].
Observing the equilibrium solutions to these non-cooperative games where
each player has access to closed-loop information about other players within detec-
tion range gives valuable insight towards UUV trajectory and mission planning, as
it represents a sort of instantaneous online trajectory optimization for each player.
Meanwhile, implementing the rolling-horizon robust obstacle avoidance for each ve-
hicle creates a collision-free feasible game as long as the sparse obstacle assumption
(4.4) holds.
5.6.1 Simulations of Equilibrium vs. Iterative Optimization
A common approach to modeling systems of non-cooperative unmanned vehi-
cles is via open-loop iterative games, where the players make decisions based only on
the initial conditions of other players, but with no information about other players’
current decisions [19], [39]. For demonstration, we establish a test model as a two-
player (NI = 2) Stackelberg-type game, where the attacker P1 selects a trajectory
based on the target position pG and the defender P2’s initial state x[2]k0 , while the
defender P2 selects its paths with full knowledge of P1’s moves.
In the “asymmetric NLP” approach, the solution sequence for each planning
horizon h is as follows: 1) Solve the attacker NLP (5.7) where the defender’s state





∀k ∈ Kh), and save the attacker solution (x[1](h), u
[1]
(h)). 2)
Solve the defender NLP (5.8) given the solution to P1’s NLP. This is repeated for
each horizon until termination criteria (capture or goal) is met. In contrast, our
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(a) MCP with perfect info (b) NLP with Asymmetric Info
Figure 5.5: Comparison of MCP vs. NLP Trajectories, Th = 60 sec
MCP-derived equilibrium, which solves simultaneously, allows each player to act
with perfect knowledge of other players’ actions throughout the planning horizon,
rather than only the initial conditions. The attacker P1’s trajectory becomes highly
dependent on the length of the planning horizon, since its knowledge of the defender
P2’s state updates only at the beginning of each horizon. Thus, as depicted in Figure
5.5, the attacker may take a far less direct path, increasing the likelihood of capture
if the planning horizon Th is relatively large.
To compare the MCP solution to the iterative optimization approach, we con-




IC , XG, Y and Z, repre-
senting the initial positions p
[i]
IC for each player, the target location pG, the actual
obstacle center cm and radius rm, as well as the detection error of obstacle center
∆c[i] and radius ∆r[i] in each replication, respectively. These RVs are summarized
in Table 5.3.
The uniform probability distributions used in the simulation were selected to
keep initial conditions arrayed to limit the number of trivial solutions where the
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Table 5.3: Random Variates for MCP vs. NLP Comparison










IC ∼ [U(100, 200),U(0, 200)]T P2 initial position
pG XG ∼ [U(0, 200),U(0, 300)]T target location
O1 Y ∼ [U(0, 100),U(0, 200),U(0, 50)]T actual obstacle attributes
∆O1 Z ∼ [U(0, 1),U(0, 2)]T detected obstacle deviation
attacker can reach its target without influence from the defender or the obstacle. A
visual representation of this simulation setup is shown in Figure 5.6. While varying
Figure 5.6: Workspace with randomly generated positions
the planning horizon length Th, four performance measures are tracked for both
solution types. These performance measures include the energy consumption for
the attacker P1 over the entire path FE, overall attacker path length FD, capture




k∈Kh fE as the cumu-
lative sum of all energy function values fE (5.1) over all horizons h. The energy
consumption seems to be slightly greater in the MCP solution than in nonlinear pro-
gram approach, because the MCP solution makes incremental changes in direction
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(accelerations) at each time step across the entire horizon, while the asymmetric
NLP solution for the attacker only accelerates once per horizon based on P2’s initial
conditions. In reality, energy is also expended as a function of propulsion to compete
with external forces like drag and buoyancy, even at constant speed. Thus, we also
investigate the expected value of the overall path length for the attacker P1 FD,




Using common random numbers (CRNs), an equilibrium solution is found
using the MCP method and performance measures stored for each simulation. The
same CRNs are used to find a solution to the test model (asymmetric NLP sequence
previously described). The results of this simulation are shown in Table 5.4 where







E(FE) σ(FE) E(FD) σ(FD)
MCP
30 28.6% 0.822 0.798 1694 284
45 40.3% 0.917 0.529 1769 194
60 51.5% 0.690 0.428 1798 347
75 53.1% 0.869 0.552 1835 130
NLP
30 20.1% 0.078 0.011 1269 151
45 48.4% 0.192 0.169 2073 69
60 70.9% 0.264 0.018 2731 100
75 77.9% 0.274 0.023 3042 103
Th is the finite designated horizon length for each rolling horizon h, E(FE) is the
total energy consumption (represented in acceleration units - m/s2) and E(FD) is the
overall path length. The E(·) and σ(·) represent the mean and standard deviation of
the simulation sample performance measures, respectively. These results are also
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Figure 5.7: Performance Measures vs. Planning Horizon Length, Th
illustrated graphically in Figure 5.7, where it can be seen that the MCP solution
tends to provide a lower bound in both capture rate and path length. The simulation
also sheds light on the approximate planning horizon range (30 ≤ Th ≤ 40 seconds)




6.1 Summary of Work
This thesis presents a formulation and an algorithm for modeling single- and
multi-agent game theory-based trajectory planning with rolling-horizon foresight
and robust obstacles in two-dimensional space. Chapter 2 discusses a nonlinear
trajectory optimization program is presented, along with fundamental game theo-
retic concepts. This trajectory optimization is solved via a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP) formulation using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality con-
ditions in Chapter 3, followed by the introduction of a pursuit-evasion game (PEG)
scenario for a single attacker, single defender and stationary target. Rolling-horizon
foresight and robust obstacles are incorporated into the model in Chapter 4, both
of which improve model performance in determining feasible solutions. In Chap-
ter 5, several improvements are made to the algorithm and simulation results are
presented.
6.2 Suggestions for Future Work
There is enormous potential yet to be investigated in the use of robust games
for spatio-temporal system validation. The mixed complementarity problem (MCP)
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is a powerful tool in the analysis of mechanical systems, and provides valuable insight
if used for benchmarking purposes. This study just skims the surface of robust,
game-driven trajectory planning, and can potentially be extended in the following
directions:
6.2.1 Dealing with Non-convexity
The non-convex obstacle avoidance constraints (2.1f) imposed on each player
in this thesis can result in a scenario that is unsolvable via MCP. There exist several
iterative schemes that convexify these constraints for a single vehicle trajectory opti-
mization problem via lossless convexification known generally as Sequential Convex
Programming [28], [12], [44]. While these might be extended to the larger system
of vehicles presented in this thesis, the obstacle constraints could also be addressed
via linear norms (e.g., L∞ and L1 norms), though these require the introduction of
additional variables in as penalty sub-functions in the objective.
The L∞ norm seems to be the most straight-forward approach to dealing with
the concave quadratic constraint associated with obstacle avoidance (2.1f). The L∞
norm can be used to replace the non-convex obstacle avoidance constraint with
gobskm(xk) = rm − zm ≤ 0 ∀ k ∈ (1, .., K), m ∈ (1, ...,M) (λkm) (6.1a)
y+km + y
−
km ≤ zm ∀ k ∈ (1, .., K), j ∈ (1, ...,M) (αkm) (6.1b)
y+km − y
−
km = pk − cm ∀ k ∈ (1, .., K), m ∈ (1, ...,M) (βkm) (6.1c)
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where rm is the obstacle radius, and ykm is the difference between the vehicle position
pk and obstacle center cm at each time step k, and zm is the maximum value of all
the difference variables ykm for each obstacle m. This also requires zm be added to
the cost functional J(s) as a penalty function.
In any case, the KKT conditions should be further investigated in future work
by determining if and when the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification
(MFCQ) holds for any given scenario.
6.2.2 Inevitable Collision States
Though solving our system iteratively over rolling horizons improves computa-
tional efficiency and overall performance, there are inherent risks that this method
could possibly select a trajectory with an unsafe terminal state in horizon h that
leads to a collision in horizon h+ 1, called an inevitable collision state [15], [5], [21].
In practice, this situation arises when a vehicle travels toward its target, but pro-
vided a finite horizon, does not consider the obstacle directly in front of it when it
reaches its terminal state xkN . Thus on the subsequent horizon, its velocity causes
it to collide with an obstacle in the next horizon, resulting in an infeasible solution.
While the algorithm presented in this thesis does not directly address this issue
and guarantee avoidance from inevitable collision, the adaptive, robust obstacles
presented in Chapter 4 mitigate this risk almost entirely due to how the effective
obstacles update (e.g., shrink or shift) between horizons.
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6.2.3 Software Interface
The MATLAB-GAMS software interface chosen to implement this model car-
ries with it several limitations, but provide quite a bit of flexibility once overcome.
First of all, neither are open source platforms. For academic research, this is no
serious problem since MATLAB is provided through the university and the GAMS
license required to run the PATH solver can be requested directly from the GAMS
sales team. Second, the GAMS sets and variable declaration requirements add a
great deal of complexity and require an entire MATLAB script to prepare. However,
once this step is complete, the solve speed and accuracy are exceptional. Contin-
ued development on the interface between these two packages would be beneficial
to continued research on spatio-temporal games, as would a game theory-focused
general validation package.
6.2.4 Vehicle-based Rigid Body Dynamics
To improve our formulation further, we can implement vehicle-based dynamics
by shifting from the Cartesian “earth-fixed” workspace perspective to a vehicle-
centric polar coordinate perspective. The vehicle state tuple would become x =
(p1, p2, θ, v), where θ denotes the vehicle orientation and v represents vehicle speed,
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This approach introduces significant non-convexity due to the trigonometric func-
tions, but is a natural transition to relating this research to optimal control with
greater degrees of freedom.
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